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THE (UNLIKELY) DEATH OF PROPERTY
JAMES E. KRIER*
Is property dead? Thomas Grey has argued that it is.' If he is
right, we have an answer to the principal question of this sym-
posium panel, which asks whether regulation and property are
allies or enemies. If Professor Grey is right, they are neither-
because property no longer exists. If he is wrong (as I believe
he partly is), then, I argue, regulation and property are allies
and enemies alike, and will remain so.
I.
Professor Grey observes that at one time, about 200 years
ago, the idea of property thrived in the one-dimensional, abso-
lute, fixed, and concrete terms of thing-ownership.2 Property
designated relationships between people and tangible objects.
Over these objects, owners had essentially exclusive control.
Interference with property, by the state in particular, required
the weightiest justification. Property marked out a rather invio-
lable space, a fortress for each against all. It stood for and ad-
vanced the freedom and equality of individuals. It rested on a
dominant liberal ideology whose philosophical foundations
had been laid down by Locke3 with his theory of labor, and by
Kant4 and Hegel' with their theories of individual will.
The vital idea and ideal of this conception were reflected in
Blackstone's description of property as a man's place of "sole
and despotic dominion"6 and by the declarations in early
American state constitutions that property is a natural right.7
According to Professor Grey, this conception of property "dis-
integrated" with the growth of capitalism, the industrial econ-
omy, and the activist welfare state. The process started
innocently, as people, through purely voluntary transactions,
* Earl Warren DeLano Professor of Law, University of Michigan. My thanks to Greg
Alexander, Rick Pildes, and Peter Westen for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1. See Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in 22 NoMos: PROPERTY 69 (1980).
2. See id. at 74.
3. See J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (P. Laslett rev. ed. 1963) (3d ed.
1698).
4. See I. KANT, PHILOSOPHY OF LAw (1887).
5. See G. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (1896).
6. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2 (11th ed. 1791).
7. See R. SCHLATrER, PRIVATE PROPERTY: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 188-89 (1951).
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began to fragment property and ownership for the sake of the
division of labor and for the sake of economies of scale in de-
veloping ifffustrial capitalism. An unanticipated result was that
property evolved into an abstraction of many dimensions, the
familiar "bundle of rights" that lawyers and other specialists
speak of today. The working conception changed from one of a
relationship between a person and a thing to one of relation-
ships among people with respect to things, with many people
"owning" many interests (sometimes contingent, deferred, or
both) in the same "thing" at the same time. "Things," more-
over, extended beyond tangibles to include metaphysical, in-
tangible claims, like the stocks and bonds invented to advance
industrial organization and finance.
In this process, Professor Grey says, property necessarily lost
its distinctive characteristics; it was no longer about real thing-
ownership, no longer absolute and exclusive, no longer fixed
and concrete. The old conception was dead.'
Professor Grey sees the "death of property" 9 as having vari-
ous consequences, two of which are related to the topic of this
speech. First, "the specialists [lawyers and economists, for ex-
ample] who design and manipulate the legal structures of the
advanced capitalist economies could easily do without using
the term 'property' at all."'10 Second, property ceased to be "a
central category of legal and political thought."'" I regard the
first assertion as essentially correct. The second, in my view, is
wrong.
II.
From the standpoint of managing an economy, property
might indeed be said to have lost much of its old distinction,
precisely because of its disintegration into a bundle of rights. It
has become, arguably, just another adaptable means, along
with regulation, of conducting the everyday business of
(re) distributing and (re)allocating power, resources, and
wealth. In this sense, regulation and property can be seen as
little more than different tools for doing the same things; they
8. See Grey, supra note 1, at 74.
9. d at 77.
10. Id. at 73.
11. Id. at 82; see also id. at 81 ("property ceases to be an important category in legal
and political theory").
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are in the same toolbox, which belongs to the state. The.choice
between them turns little on ideology, unless one counts as ide-
ology the narrow utilitarian calculation of what works best (or
most efficiently) in a given situation.
The conventional analysis of determining what works best
can be summarized as follows. If we can count on relatively
fluid transacting, then it is best to manage by defining property
rights (which we might do in a way sensitive to distributive
desires), permitting trades, and counting on market forces to
generate efficient allocations through a decentralized system of
control. If, on the other hand, transaction costs are high (if
there is "market failure"), and a system of centralized regula-
tion is relatively cheap, then centralized regulation through the
government suggests itself as the better alternative. We need to
bear in mind, of course, that the government too can fail, but
we also should not ignore the fact that government interven-
tion can, at times, improve on even a rather smoothly function-
ing market. These considerations complicate the choice
between property rights and regulation in practice, but not in
principle. 12
The foregoing suggests that most economies, whatever their
dominant ideology, will manage by a mix of means, with reli-
ance in some instances on property rights and in others on reg-
ulation. This mixture is exactly what we observe. The mixture
is not usually quite so simple, of course, because property and
regulation can be combined into hybrids created to manage
any given situation. There are many instances of hybridization,
a prominent one today being the system of "marketable pollu-
tion rights" devised as a means of controlling environmental
problems. '3 The idea behind this hybrid is that the government
sets the total amount of pollution that sources can produce,
12. Choice will no doubt be affected by predisposition. A society bent in an activist
direction might choose the government absent a convincing showing that state inter-
vention fails; a society bent toward laissez faire might choose the market absent proof
of market failure. Given uncertainty, the mix of means in the two societies will obvi-
ously be very different. See M. KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIEs 290-95
(1987) (discussing "Privileged Positions"--for example, where we "say that regulation
corrects for marketfailure, not that we regulate social interactions through 'free' markets
when conditions allow us to").
13. On the prominence of the idea, see Passell, Sale of Air Pollution Permits is Part of
Bush Acid Rain Plan, N.Y. Times, May 17, 1989, at 1, col. 1. See.generally Ackerman &
Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985) (supporting eco-
nomic incentive systems as alternatives to centralized regulatory control of environ-
mental problems).
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just as it does in the case of conventional legislative and admin-
istrative control of pollution, but then, unlike the conventional
approach, the market more or less takes over. The amount of
pollution fixed by the government is divided into a number of
transferable (marketable) pollution rights (for example, one
right for each unit of a given pollutant that can be put into the
environment per day). The rights are distributed by auction or
some other means and are used as sources choose. If a source
pollutes, it consumes its rights; if it controls its pollution, it re-
tains them, leaving the rights available for sale to other sources.
Sources for whom pollution abatement is relatively cheap will
likely abate and sell their surplus of rights to others who find
control more costly. It is easy to demonstrate that this system
of marketable rights is, in principle, a better means of manage-
ment than the conventional approach of "command and con-
trol" that dictates pollution limits for each source. Marketable
rights require less information, they create more constructive
incentives on the part of polluters, and they minimize the costs
of achieving any given level of abatement.
Related to marketable rights are other hybrids, such as trans-
ferable development rights in land use, devices that would cre-
ate a "market" in babies or in public versus private education,
and so forth. 4 What are we talking about in instances like
these, regulation or property? Neither? Both? From the man-
agement perspective, it hardly matters. Regulation and prop-
erty have become related means to the same end. They are
simply variations in a more general category of operational
techniques. Property is just a system of regulation, and vice
versa. We can mix and choose in the name of what works best,
not in the name of "regulation" or "property" as fundamen-
tally distinct, value-laden concepts. The labels need not matter,
just as Professor Grey suggests.' 5 We could manage as well
without them.
III.
I suppose one could say from the foregoing that property is
"dead"-that we no longer have to use the word and the con-
14. On transferable development rights, see J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, PROPERTY
1089-92 (2d ed. 1988); on a market for babies, see R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 139-43 (3d ed. 1986).
15. See Grey, supra note 1, at 73.
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cept (or the word and concept "regulation" either) when it
comes to managing the material aspects of everyday life. Alter-
natively stated, regulation and property have become allies in
matters of management. But are they, in any respect, enemies?
Ideologically, of course, regulation and property rights have
long been opposed. Regulation is synonymous with active state
intervention, whereas property rights are the historic and right-
eous obstacle to intervention. The fundamental role of prop-
erty rights, in this context, is (as already suggested) to delineate
and protect domains of individual freedom against other indi-
viduals and especially against the government. In Professor
Grey's view, though, the obstacle has disintegrated. Property is
dead not simply as a term of art, but as an ideology as well; it is
no longer "a central category of legal and political thought." 6
The label has become so diluted that it has lost its rhetorical
power in confrontations with the activist state.
Oddly enough, Professor Grey offers little evidence in sup-
port of this assertion. He does point to recent important polit-
ical theory in which the ideology of property figures little, if at
all.17 Obviously, though, establishing what some people do not
think about property proves nothing with regard to what other
people do think about it. I suppose that Professor Grey
presents little evidence simply because he believes that the
transformation of property into a bundle of rights must neces-
sarily lead, as a matter of logic, to the end of the old ideology.
Because we no longer have "a clearly comprehended unitary
concept" of property, "the forceful intuitions behind the moral
arguments for simple thing-ownership" must lose their force in
our political lives.18
Does it follow that if property has become, from the perspec-
tive of management, something of a dead letter, it must be-
come as much from the standpoint of ideology, too? It certainly
doesn't follow logically, 9 nor does it seem to follow in fact.
16. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
17. See Grey, supra note 1, at 81 (stating that the concept of property rights plays
little part inJ. RAwLs, A THEORY OFJUSTICE (1971)).
18. Grey, supra note 1, at 78. The notion of logical necessity is suggested later: "for-
mulation of... economic entitlements in something like the bundle-of-rights form...
must lead to the decline of property as a central category of legal and political thought."
Id. at 82 (emphasis added).
19. Consider also that property had, in many respects, "disintegrated" well before
its ideological dominance in the Eighteenth Century, yet it dominated anyway. Present
and future, vested and contingent, common and several, and other fragmented inter-
No. 1]
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There is, for example, contemporary political theory in which
the traditional conception of property does play an important
role2° (some of this theory is even mentioned by Professor
Grey in another context) .21 There are influential figures like
Milton Friedman, who underscores the ideological place of
property when he says that its managerial advantages are but a
happy circumstance, that the true role of property is to protect
liberty without regard to such matters as efficiency.22 Finally, as
Professor Grey acknowledges, the common folk hold in their
own minds the traditional ideology of property. Surely the
common mindset influences political discussion, political
thought, and legal development, and influences it powerfully.
This would be the case even if political and legal specialists did
not share the traditional ideology, so long as they had to be
responsive to it. Professor Grey's concession that specialists
also subscribe to the old and common view "in their unprofes-
sional moments" 23 simply provides another reason to be skep-
tical of his claim.
Absent more compelling evidence, then, it seems unlikely
that the old ideology of property is dead and gone. The fact
that we can do without the label for purposes of management
does not mean that the concept has lost its fundamental appeal
in political argument. Professor Grey concludes otherwise, I
think, because he fails to recognize the different roles that
property plays in various aspects of discourse, including the
discourse of specialists. Even a specialist can effectively lose a
sense of property with regard to one role while keeping it alive
with regard to another.
ests in property already existed for several centuries prior to Blackstone, for example,
but he and the common folk nevertheless thought about property in an absolute and
unitary way.
20. See, e.g., R. NoZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974) (an example that ap-
peared prominently in print well before Professor Grey wrote his essay in 1980). Post-
Grey writings would include R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER
OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985). For Professor Grey's strident views on Professor Epstein's
book, see Grey, The Malthusian Constitution, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 21 (1986).
21. See, e.g., Grey, supra note 1, at 72, 82 n.6 (discussing Reich, The New Property, 73
YALE LJ. 733 (1964)). Charles Reich stressed the role of property in protecting security
and independence.
22. See M. FRIEDMAN, CAPrrALSM AND FREEDOM 7-21 (1962) (private property is es-
sential to political freedom).
23. Grey, supra note 1, at 69.
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IV.
None of this means, of course, that the fragmentation of
property has been without cultural and political consequences.
Important among these is a certain very complicated tension in
modem deliberations about "regulation" versus "property
rights." The tension results not merely because regulation and
property rights can be seen as standing starkly against each
other (as perhaps they once did) but because they stand for and
against at one and the same time-managerially allied, ideolog-
ically opposed. In a society that values both efficiency and lib-
erty, utilitarianism and rights, management and ideology, this
is bound to create complications. Both modem liberals and
modem conservatives (old-fashioned liberals) will find them-
selves confounded when forced to choose between good prin-
ciples and sound practices.
Go back, for example, to the idea of marketable rights men-
tioned in section II. Should a conservative favor these because
they promote efficiency and seem to "rely on the market," or
oppose them as just another instance of regulation (perhaps a
cleverly seductive instance designed to co-opt libertarian objec-
tions)? In the same vein, should a liberal favor marketable
rights because they strengthen the hand of the activist state, or
indict them as a measure that treats the environment as just
another commodity and fails to stigmatize the illicit motives of
polluters?24
If all that mattered were management, if the old ideology of
property were indeed dead, choices between property and reg-
ulation still would be difficult ones; that property lives as ideol-
ogy makes them only more so. The choices would be difficult
even if managerial efficacy were the only measure of good gov-
emiment, simply because relative efficacy is such a difficult
thing to establish. It is generally impossible to know what
works best as a means of managing a given situation. It com-
monly seems that we have so much information about what
works best that we might as well have no information at all; the
sheer abundance of "facts" on either side often makes the mat-
ter of managerial success essentially indeterminate. If, for ex-
ample, an enthusiast of the activist state wants to show that
regulation of land use through zoning is a good thing, he has
24. See generally S. KELMAN, WHAT PRICE INCENTIVES? 27-91 (1981).
No. 1]
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an abundance of data by which to make out his case. If a skeptic
wants to show otherwise, and show that a property approach
works better, the data are available for him as well.
Consider as an illustration of this an item from The New Re-
public, a magazine that occasionally reprints self-cancelling
headlines garnered from the newspapers. The magazine re-
ported that on January 1, 1989, the Boston Globe announced
"Massachusetts Anti-Snob Zoning Found Ineffective." On the
next day the same paper said "Massachusetts Anti-Snob Rule
Called a Success." 25 I have no reason to doubt that both of
these headlines were correct in the sense that each was sup-
ported by enormous amounts of evidence. It seems that no
matter what the claim about managerial success or failure,
there are plenty of facts on either side. People go to graduate
school for years just to learn to gather these so-called facts and
use them to support any viewpoint. In interesting cases there
are bound to be many competing realities, much empirical
thrust and parry.26 Seldom can we get to a vantage point that
allows us to see the actual, incontestable truth-not even with
the help of computers, which are in my view unlikely to allevi-
ate the paradoxical poverty of fact amidst such factual plenty.
Computers simply contribute what the term "artificial intelli-
gence" suggests.
The foregoing implies more than managerial confusion; it
virtually guarantees that the old ideal of property will remain a
standard component of political discourse. To what, after all,
do we resort when we cannot determine the decisive facts? Isn't
it, among other things, to faith, to ideology? Ideology almost
always shapes the search for and interpretation of facts in any
event.27 Indeterminacy simply forces ideology into the open.
V.
Speaking generally, sheer uncertainty makes it difficult to im-
agine a world without ideology. Speaking particularly, the ide-
25. THE NEw REPUBLIC, Feb. 20, 1989, at 11.
26. See, e.g., Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and "Em-
pirical" Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199 (1988); see also Hirsch-
man, Reactionary Rhetoric, ATLANTmc MONTHLY, May 1989, at 63 (advancing, but not
approving, the thesisof the "perverse effect," whereby "opponents of progressive im-
pulses in society" attempt to show "that reformist measures ... invariably have effects
that are contrary to the ones intended").
27. This line is pursued, in the context of regulation versus property, in Alexander,
Takings, Narratives, and Power, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1752 (1988).
[Vol. 13
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ology of property can for this reason alone hardly be thought
to have passed. Announcements of its death are premature.
Property will continue to serve, though with ups and downs, as
a vital symbol of appropriate relationships between the individ-
ual and the state.
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